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Abstract
The voting system in the Legislative Council of Hong Kong (Legco)
is sometimes unicameral and sometimes bicameral, depending on whether
the bill is proposed by the Hong Kong government. Therefore, although
without any representative within Legco, the Hong Kong government has
certain degree of legislative power — as if there is a virtual representative
of the Hong Kong government within the Legco. By introducing such a
virtual representative of the Hong Kong government, we show that Legco is
a three-dimensional voting system. We also calculate two power indices of
the Hong Kong government through this virtual representative and consider
the C-dimension and the W-dimension of Legco. Finally, some implications
of this Legco model to the current constitutional reform in Hong Kong will
be given.
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1 Introduction
The voting system used in the Hong Kong Legislative Council (Legco) is unique
within the current, global range of electoral systems because it is sometimes uni-
cameral and sometimes bicameral, depending on whether the bill is proposed by
the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). Be-
cause of this special feature, it would be interesting to study this voting system
from the mathematical point of view. In this article, we shall construct a mathe-
matical model of this voting system and conduct a detailed mathematical analysis
of it. For example, we shall measure the complexity of the voting mechanism of
Legco by computing its dimension.
It was proposed in Taylor (1995) that different voting systems can be classified
by their dimensions. We shall state the precise definition of the dimension of a
voting system in the next section but it is easier to grasp the idea by considering
some examples. The usual unicameral system in which the bills will be passed
by a simple majority vote of the members is a one dimensional voting system.
Bicameral legislatures require a concurrent majority to pass legislation are two
dimensional voting systems. In 1995, Alan D. Taylor mentioned in Taylor (1995)
that he did not know any real-world voting system of dimension 3 or higher and
this point was reiterated in page 255 of the second edition of Taylor (1995). Such
a real-world voting system of dimension 3 was first provided by Josep Freixas in
2004. He showed in Freixas (2004) that the dimension of the European Union
Council under the Nice rules (since 2000) is 3. In this article, we shall show that
the voting system of Legco (since 1998) is also of dimension 3. So we have two
very different real voting systems of dimension 3.
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By 2014, Legco consists of two groups of legislators: one group comprising
35 members selected in the functional constituencies and the other group compris-
ing the remaining 35 members elected by universal suffrage in the geographical
constituencies. About half of the 35 functional constituencies seats go to business
sectors, about one-third belongs to sectors for professionals and the rest are for
representatives of social organizations or district councils. For a detailed analysis
of the functional constituencies, see Loh et al. (2006) and Ma (2009).
Since the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, in order to strengthen the executive
dominance over the legislature, the Basic Law (the constitutional document for the
HKSAR) requires the passage of motions, bill or amendments to government bills
introduced by legislators to pass by the concurrent majorities of two groups. On
the other hand, motions, amendments to motions, bills and amendments to bill
raised by the Hong Kong government only need a simple majority vote of the
members present to pass.
Therefore, Legco is sometimes unicameral and sometimes bicameral, depend-
ing on whether the bill is proposed by the Hong Kong government. This unique
feature of Legco makes the computation of the dimension of it a non-trivial task.
For example, given a coalition of 35 members from the geographical constituen-
cies and 2 members from the functional constituencies, there is no way to tell if
it is a winning coalition or a losing coalition (unless you know if the bill is pro-
posed by the Hong Kong government). To overcome this difficulty, we introduce
a virtual representative of the Hong Kong government, which will vote for a bill if
it is proposed by the government but against a bill otherwise. To be more precise,
the 35 members from geographical constituencies are numbered 1, ..., 35, the 35
members from functional constituencies are numbered 36, ..., 70, and the virtual
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member (the government) is numbered 71. Then, a coalition or subset S of the set
{1, 2, ..., 70, 71} is a winning coalition if and only if
(a) 71 ∈ S and |S ∩ {1, ..., 70}| ≥ 36, or
(b) 71 < S , |S ∩ {1, ..., 35}| > 18 and |S ∩ {36, ..., 70}| > 18.
where V∩U is the intersection of the two coalitions V and U and |U | is the number
of members in the coalition U.
With this mathematical model of Legco, the voting system of Legco becomes
a simple game (see the definition in the next section) and it is now possible to
compute the dimension of Legco which will turn out to be 3 (see section 3).
Although there is no representative of the government of HKSAR in Legco,
this voting system has given the Hong Kong government a certain degree of leg-
islative power. With the introduction of member 71, the virtual representative of
the government, we can then calculate various power indices of the Hong Kong
government within Legco and compare its power with that of any individual Legco
member. This will be done in section 4. Finally, in section 5, we shall discuss
some implications of our mathematical analysis of Legco to the current constitu-
tional reform in Hong Kong.
2 Dimension of a simple game
Definition 1. A (monotonic) simple game or a voting system is a pair (N, v) where
N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players and v : 2N → {0, 1} is the characteristic
function defined on the power set 2N of N, which satisfies v(φ) = 0, v(N) = 1 and
v(S ) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . A coalition of players S ⊆ N is winning if v(S ) = 1
and losing if v(S ) = 0.
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A weighted majority game is a simple game which can be realized by a vector
(w1, ...,wn) together with a threshold q which makes the representation [q; w1, . . . ,wn]
in such a way that S is a winning coalition if and only if ∑ j∈S w j ≥ q.
A weighted m-majority game is a simple game which can be expressed by m
realizations [qi; wi1, . . . ,win], 1 ≤ i ≤ m, in such a way that S is a winning coalition
if and only if ∑ j∈S wij ≥ qi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. So a weighted m-majority game can
be considered as an intersection of m weighted majority games and we can also
represent it by an amalgamated matrix

q1; w11 · · · w1n
...
...
qm; wm1 · · · wmn

.
Every weighted majority game is obviously a (monotonic) simple game. How-
ever, the converse is in general not true and we shall see in the next section that
the voting system of Legco is not a weighted majority game. To show that certain
voting system cannot be realized as a weighted majority game, it would be use-
ful to know that any weighted majority game must be swap robust, namely, for
any two winning coalitions S and S ′ in a weighted voting system, if we make a
one-for-one exchange of players, then at least one of the two resulting coalitions
must still be a winning coalition (see Taylor (1995)). Here one of the players in
the swap must belong to S but not S ′, and the other must belong to S ′ but not S .
Even though not any simple game is a weighted majority game, it was proved
in Taylor (1995) that every simple game can be realized as a weighted m-majority
game. The smallest such possible m is called the dimension of the game.
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The computation of the dimension of a simple game has been proved to be a
hard computational problem (see Deineko and Woeginger (2006)), thus our cal-
culation is a complex task which will be done by combinatorial arguments for the
particular voting system at hand. The dimension of other complex voting systems
using combinatorial arguments were studied quite recently in Freixas and Puente
(2008).
However, even if two games are of the same dimension, they may not be equiv-
alent. In the literature, different types of dimensions have been introduced (see
Freixas and Marciniak (2009)). Before giving their definitions, we need to intro-
duce two orderings related to the power of individual members in a game (see
Carreras and Freixas (2008)).
For any i, j ∈ N, we say that i ≤D j if for any U ⊂ N such that i, j < U, we
have U ∪ { j} is a winning coalition whenever U ∪ {i} is. A game is complete if ≤D
is total. It is known that a game is complete if and only if it is swap robust.
An i ∈ N is crucial in a winning coalition U if U \ {i} is no longer winning.
We say that i ≤d j if the number of winning coalitions of size k containing i with i
crucial is smaller than or equal to the number of those containing j with j crucial
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. A game is weakly complete if ≤d is total.
Every simple game can be realized as an interaction of a finite number of
complete games, the smallest possible number is called the C-dimension of the
game. Likewise, every simple game can be realized as an interaction of a finite
number of weakly complete games, the smallest possible number is called the W-
dimension of the game. For a detailed analysis of various types of dimensions, we
refer the readers to Freixas and Marciniak (2009).
Every weighted game is complete and every complete game is weakly com-
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plete (see Carreras and Freixas (2008)). Hence,
1. W-dimension(v) ≤ C-dimension(v) ≤ dimension(v) for all simple game v;
2. if the simple game v is weighted, then dimension(v) is 1 and hence both
W-dimension(v) and C-dimension(v) are equal to 1;
3. if the simple game v is complete, then C-dimension(v) is equal to 1 and
therefore W-dimension(v) is also equal to 1.
3 Hong Kong Legco System
Recall that the Legco members are divided into two groups: half of the mem-
bers are returned by geographical constituencies through direct elections, and the
other half by functional constituencies. On the writing of this article, there are 70
members in the current fifth term Legco (2012-2016). The composition of Legco
beyond the third term is not specified in the Basic Law (the constitutional docu-
ment for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region). However, article 68 of
the Basic Law requires that
“The method for forming the Legislative Council shall be specified in the light
of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in
accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim
is the election of all the members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage.”
While the Basic Law now no longer expressly dictates the formation of the
fifth term Legco of HKSAR in the year 2012, in December 2007, the Standing
Committee of National People’s Congress (SCNPC) decided that
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“The ratio of functional constituency members to geographical constituency
members shall not be changed and the procedures for voting on bills and motions
in the Legislative Council shall remain unchanged.”
The details of the decisions of SCNPC in December 2007 can be found in
http://www.legco.hk (the official website of Hong Kong Legislative Council).
In view of the above constraints on the pace of constitutional reform in Hong
Kong, it makes sense to assume that Legco has 2n legislative members, say rep-
resented by 1, ..., 2n, with n an arbitrary positive integer. We further assume that
among the 2n Legco members, the first n members are returned by geographi-
cal constituencies through direct elections, while the remaining n members are
returned by functional constituencies.
We also assume that a bill will be passed if
(a) the bill is proposed by the Hong Kong government and it is supported by a
simple majority in Legco; or
(b) the bill is proposed by a Legco member and it is supported by a simple
majority in each of the two groups.
Finally, we again introduce a virtual representative of the Hong Kong gov-
ernment (denoted by 2n + 1), which will vote for a bill if it is proposed by the
government but against a bill otherwise. Now we can reformulate Legco as a sim-
ple game of size 2n + 1.
Definition 2. Legco of size 2n is a (monotonic) simple game of 2n + 1 players
1, . . . , 2n + 1, such that S is a winning coalition if one of the following holds:
(a) 2n + 1 ∈ S and |S ∩ {1, . . . , 2n}| ≥ n + 1
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(b) 2n + 1 < S and |S ∩ {1, . . . , n}| > n2 and |S ∩ {n + 1, . . . , 2n}| > n2 .
Our first result is a comparison of powers among individuals.
Proposition 1.
(a) j =D k for any 1 ≤ j, k ≤ n or n + 1 ≤ j, k ≤ 2n.
(b) 1 =d n + 1 but 1 and n + 1 are not D-comparable.
(c) When n is even, j <D 2n + 1 for any 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n.
(d) If n is odd and n > 4, then j and 2n + 1 are not d-comparable for any 1 ≤ j ≤
2n.
Proof. (a) and (b) are trivial.
For (c) and (d), we assume j = 1. Consider U = {n + 1, . . . , 2n}. Obviously
(P): U ∪ {2n + 1} is winning but U ∪ {1} is not.
(c) Suppose n is even. If S ∪ {1} is winning for some coalition S = 1, then
|S ∩ {1, . . . , n}| ≥ n2 and |S ∩ {n + 1, . . . , 2n − 1}| ≥ n2 + 1.
Thus |S | ≥ n + 1 and hence S ∪ {2n + 1} is a winning coalition. Therefore
1 ≤D 2n + 1.
Together with (P), we have 1 <D 2n + 1.
(d) Suppose n is odd. We have S = {1, . . . , (n + 1)/2} ∪ {n + 1, . . . , (3n + 1)/2}
which is a winning coalition of size n + 1 with 1 crucial, but there is no winning
coalition of size n + 1 with 2n + 1 crucial. On the other hand, from (P), clearly
there are less winning coalitions of size 2n with 1 crucial then those with 2n + 1
crucial. Therefore, we have 1 and 2n + 1 are not d-comparable. 
Our first main result is the following
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Theorem 1. Legco of size 2n is of dimension 1 if n = 1 or 2, of dimension 2 if
n = 3 or 4, and of dimension 3 if n ≥ 5.
Proof. For n = 1 or 2, Legco is of dimension 1 as one can check easily that Legco
of size 2 is realized by [2; 1, 1, 0] and Legco of size 4 is realized by [4; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1].
So we shall let n ≥ 3 and we shall use ⌊x⌋ and ⌈x⌉ to denote the greatest integer
less than or equal to x and the least integer greater than or equal to x respectively.
Recall that Legco is of dimension 1 means that it is a weighted majority game
(which must be swap robust). Let S = {1, ..., ⌊n/2⌋, ⌊n/2⌋+1, n+1, ..., n+⌊n/2⌋, n+
⌊n/2⌋+1} and S ′ = {1, ..., ⌊n/2⌋, ⌊n/2⌋+2, n+1, ..., n+ ⌊n/2⌋, n+ ⌊n/2⌋+2}. Then
both of them are winning coalitions of Legco. Now if we swap ⌊n/2⌋+1 in S with
n + ⌊n/2⌋ + 2 in S ′, then we get the following two coalitions
{1, ..., ⌊n/2⌋, n + 1, ..., n + ⌊n/2⌋, n + ⌊n/2⌋ + 1, ⌊n/2⌋ + 2}
and
{1, ..., ⌊n/2⌋, ⌊n/2⌋ + 1, ⌊n/2⌋ + 2, n + 1, ..., n + ⌊n/2⌋}.
Since both of them are losing coalitions, Legco is not swap robust. Hence, for
n ≥ 3, Legco of size 2n cannot be of C-dimension 1 and of dimension 1 as it is
not swap robust.
For n = 3 or 4, Legco is of dimension 2 as one can check easily that Legco of
size 6 can be realized by

10; 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 1
10; 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 1
 and Legco of size 8 can be realized
by

15; 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4
15; 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4
.
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From now on, we will assume that n ≥ 5. We first show that Legco of size 2n
can be realized as a 3-weighted majority game.
Let
A =

n + 1;
n︷︸︸︷
1 · · · 1
n︷︸︸︷
1 · · · 1 0
n + 1
2
; 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0 n
2
n + 1
2
; 0 · · · 0 1 · · · 1 n
2

.
We will show that the winning coalitions of the game realized by A are exactly the
winning coalitions of Legco. Hence A realizes Legco and the dimension of Legco
is less than or equal to 3.
Note that S ⊂ {1, ..., 2n + 1} is a winning coalition of the 3-weighted majority
game defined by the amalgamated matrix A if and only if
(i) |S ∩ {1, . . . , 2n}| ≥ n + 1; and
(ii) |S ∩ {1, . . . , n}| + n2 |S ∩ {2n + 1}| ≥ n+12 ; and
(iii) |S ∩ {n + 1, . . . , 2n}| + n2 |S ∩ {2n + 1}| ≥ n+12 .
It is clear that 2n + 1 ∈ S and i, ii, iii hold ⇔ 2n + 1 ∈ S and i holds. Also,
2n + 1 < S and i, ii, iii hold ⇔ 2n + 1 < S and i, ii hold. Therefore S is a winning
coalition of the game induced by the amalgamated matrix A if and only if S is a
winning coalition of Legco and we are done.
Finally, it remains to show that the dimension of Legco cannot be 2.
Suppose B =

q1; e11 · · · e1n f 11 · · · f 1n g1
q2; e21 · · · e2n f 21 · · · f 2n g2
 realizes Legco. Let W be a
winning coalition of the game induced by B. If W = E ∪ F, where E ⊆ {1, ..., n}
and F ⊆ {n + 1, ..., 2n}, then for any permutation σ on {1, ..., n} and permutation τ
on {n+ 1, ..., 2n}, σ(E)∪ τ(F) is also a winning coalition as any ordinary member
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of Legco has the same voting power. Therefore,
∑
k∈E e
i
σ(k) +
∑
j∈F f iτ( j)−n ≥ qi, for
i = 1, 2.
Start with an equality ∑k∈E eik + ∑ j∈F f ij ≥ qi for a fixed i, by considering
suitable permutation pairs σ and τ, we can obtain nC|E| × nC|F| similar inequali-
ties. Summing all these inequalities and we notice that for each k and l, there are
n−1C|E|−1 × nC|F| eik and nC|E| × n−1C|F|−1 f il in the resulting inequality. Divide the
whole inequality by nC|E|×nC|F|, we have |E|ei+|F | f i ≥ qi, where ei = 1n(ei1+· · ·+ein)
and f i = 1
n
( f i1 + · + f in), i = 1, 2. Similarly, if the winning coalition W is of the
form W = E ∪ F ∪ {2n + 1}, where E ⊆ {1, ..., n} and F ⊆ {n + 1, ..., 2n}, then we
have |E|ei+ |F | f i+gi ≥ qi,i = 1, 2. Therefore, if we consider another amalgamated
matrix B′ =

q1; e1 · · · e1 f 1 · · · f 1 g1
q2; e2 · · · e2 f 2 · · · f 2 g2
, then any winning coalition of B
must be a winning coalition of B′. By using a similar argument, we can also show
that any losing coalition of B must be a losing coalition of B′. Hence, the games
induced by B and B′ will have exactly the same set of the winning coalitions.
Therefore without loss of generality, for B, we can assume that ei1 = · · · = ein = ei
and f i1 = · · · = f in = f i, i = 1, 2. Since eik and f ik are non-negative and B realizes
Legco, we must have ei > 0 and f i > 0.
Note that {1, . . . , ⌊n/2⌋ + 1, n + 1, . . . , n + ⌊n/2⌋ + 1} is a winning coalition of
Legco and hence (⌊n/2⌋ + 1)ei + (⌊n/2⌋ + 1) f i ≥ qi, i = 1, 2.
On the other hand, {1, . . . , n, n + 1, . . . , n + ⌊n/2⌋} is not a winning coalition
of Legco and hence either ne1 + ⌊n/2⌋ f 1 < q1 or ne2 + ⌊n/2⌋ f 2 < q2 . If it is the
former case, then ne1 + ⌊n/2⌋ f 1 < q1 ≤ (⌊n/2⌋ + 1)e1 + (⌊n/2⌋ + 1) f 1 and thus
(⌈n/2⌉ − 1)e1 < f 1. Similarly if it is the latter case, then (⌈n/2⌉ − 1)e2 < f 2.
By symmetry, we also have (⌈n/2⌉ − 1) f 1 < e1 or (⌈n/2⌉ − 1) f 2 < e2. Note
that if (⌈n/2⌉ − 1)e1 < f 1 and (⌈n/2⌉ − 1) f 1 < e1, then we have (⌈n/2⌉ − 1)2 < 1
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which is impossible for n ≥ 3. Hence, without loss of generality, we may assume
that (⌈n/2⌉ − 1)e1 < f 1 and (⌈n/2⌉ − 1) f 2 < e2.
Now {1, . . . , ⌈n/2⌉ + 1, n + 1, . . . , n + ⌊n/2⌋, 2n + 1}(which has n + 1 ordinary
Legco members) is a winning coalition of Legco, thus (⌈n/2⌉+ 1)e1 + (⌊n/2⌋) f 1 +
g1 ≥ q1. It follows from (⌈n/2⌉ − 1)e1 < f 1 that 2e1 + (⌊n/2⌋ + 1) f 1 + g1 ≥ q1.
Clearly, {1, n + 1, . . . , 2n, 2n + 1} is also a winning coalition of Legco, thus
e2+n f 2+g2 ≥ q2. It follows from (⌈n/2⌉−1) f 2 < e2 that 2e2+(⌊n/2⌋+1) f 2+g2 ≥
q2.
Since the set S = {1, 2, n+ 1, . . . , n+ ⌊n/2⌋ + 1, 2n+ 1} has ⌊n/2⌋ + 3 ordinary
Legco members and ⌊n/2⌋+3 < n+1 for n ≥ 5, S is a losing coalition of Legco. On
the other hand, we have 2e1+(⌊n/2⌋+1) f 1+g1 ≥ q1 and 2e2+(⌊n/2⌋+1) f 2+g2 ≥ q2
and hence S is a winning coalition of the 2-majority game induced by B. This is
a contradiction and therefore B cannot realize Legco and we are done. 
By Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.1 of Freixas (2004), both Lego and European
Union Council under the Nice rules (since 2000) are of dimension 3. However,
they are very different voting systems. For example, the voting system of the
European Union Council has a huge number of voters and the system itself is
sophistically described with a great number of different equi-desirability classes,
while the Legco voting system has just three types of voters. On the other hand,
the European voting system is a complete (or swap robust) simple game while the
Legco voting system is not by Proposition 1. Moreover, it was pointed out by the
referee of this paper that the voting system of the European Union Council has
dimension 3 but C-dimension 1 (which implies that it also has W-dimension 1)
and suggested to find out the C-dimension and the W-dimension of Legco.
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Theorem 2.
1. When n is even and n > 4, Legco of size 2n is of W-dimension 1 and C-
dimension 2.
2. When n is odd and n > 4, Legco of size 2n is of W-dimension 2 and C-
dimension 3.
Proof.
1. When n = 2k is even, the voting system is weakly complete by Proposition
1. It is not swap robust and therefore must be of C-dimension greater than
1. Note that it is the intersection of the two compete systems below:
System 1:
(a) 2n + 1 ∈ S and |S ∩ {1, . . . , 2n}| ≥ 2k + 1
(b) 2n + 1 < S and |S ∩ {1, . . . , 2n}| ≥ 2k + 2 and |S ∩ {1, . . . , n}| ≥ k + 1.
System 2:
(a) 2n + 1 ∈ S and |S ∩ {1, . . . , 2n}| ≥ 2k + 1
(b) 2n+1 < S and |S ∩ {1, . . . , 2n}| ≥ 2k+2 and |S ∩{n+1, . . . , 2n}| ≥ k+1.
Therefore it is of C-dimension 2.
2. When n = 2k + 1 is odd, the voting system is not weakly complete as 1 and
2n + 1 are not d-comparable. However, it is the intersection of two weakly
completed systems realized by the matrices below:
(
n + 1;
n︷︸︸︷
1 · · · 1
n︷︸︸︷
1 · · · 1 0
)
.
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
n + 1
2
; 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0 n
2
n + 1
2
; 0 · · · 0 1 · · · 1 n
2
 .
Therefore it is of W-dimension 2.
It remains to show that the system cannot be of C-dimension 2. Suppose on
the contrary, it is the intersection of two complete systems S 1 and S 2.
Consider two winning coalitions of our system: {1, . . . , k + 1, n + 1, . . . , n +
k + 1} and {1, . . . , k, k + 2, n + 1, . . . , n + k, n + k + 2}. Exchange k + 1 and
n + k + 2, we have losing coalitions L1 = {1, . . . , k, n + 1, . . . , n + k + 2} and
L2 = {1, . . . , k + 2, n + 1, . . . , n + k}. Since S 1 and S 2 are swap robust, we
can assume that L1 is a winning coalition of S 1 but not of S 2, and L2 is a
winning coalition of S 2 but not of S 1.
Consider another two winning coalitions: {1, . . . , k + 1, n+ 1, . . . , n+ k + 1}
and {1, . . . , k−1, k+1, k+2, n+1, . . . , n+k, n+k+2}. Exchange k and n+k+2,
we have losing coalitions L3 = {1, . . . , k − 1, k + 1, n + 1, . . . , n + k + 2} and
L2. Since L2 is a winning coalition of S 2, we have L3 is a winning coalition
of S 1.
Consider yet another two winning coalitions : {1, . . . , k+1, n+1, . . . , n+k+1}
and {1, . . . , k, k+ 2, n+ 1, . . . , n+ k, n+ k+ 3}. Exchange k+ 1 and n+ k+ 2,
we have losing coalitions L4 = {1, . . . , k, n + 1, . . . , n + k + 1, n + k + 3} and
L2. Once again, L4 is a winning coalition of S 1.
Consequently if |L∩{1, . . . , n}| ≥ k and |L∩{n+1, . . . , 2n}| ≥ k+2, then L is a
winning coalition of S 1; if |L∩{1, . . . , n}| ≥ k+2 and |L∩{n+1, . . . , 2n}| ≥ k,
then L is a winning coalition of S 2.
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Consider {1, . . . , k, k+ 2, k+ 3, n+ 1, . . . , n+ k, 2n+ 1} and {1, . . . , k+ 1, n+
1, . . . , n + k + 1}. Exchange 2n + 1 and k + 1. We get losing coalitions L5 =
{1, . . . , k+3, n+1, . . . , n+ k} and L6 = {1, . . . , k, n+1, . . . , n+ k+1, 2n+1}.
L5 is a winning coalition of S 2 and so L6 is a winning coalition of S 1.
Consider {1, . . . , k − 1, n + 1, . . . , n + k + 2, 2n + 1} and {1, . . . , k + 1, n +
1, . . . , n + k + 1}. Exchange 2n + 1 and k + 1. We get losing coalitions
L7 = {1, . . . , k − 1, k + 1, n + 1, . . . , n + k + 2} and L6. Both are winning
coalitions of S 1 and so none are winning coalitions of S 2, contradicting that
S 2 is swap robust.
Thus our system cannot be of C-dimension 2 and therefore has C-dimension
3.

4 Power Indices
In this section, we will try to quantify the power of the Hong Kong government
within Legco. Indeed, we are more interested in the ratio of the power of the
Hong Kong government to the power of an elected member of Legco. We will
consider the two most common power indices,namely, the Shapley-Shubik Index
(see Shapley and Shubik (1954)) and the Bahzhaf Index (see Bahzhaf (1965)).
These two power indices are ordinally equivalent, and therefore rank play-
ers equally, for weakly complete games and also for larger classes of cooperative
games like semi-coherent and coherent games (see Freixas (2010)). However,
when these two power indices are compared, in the class of weakly complete
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games, with other well-known power indices, then the equivalent ranking pro-
vided by Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices do not necessarily coincide with
the rankings of some others well-known power indices such as the Johnston index
(see Freixas et al. (2012)).
4.1 Banzhaf Index
For a member k ∈ {1, ..., 2n + 1}, we define b(k) to be the number of winning
coalitions S such that k ∈ S and S \{k} is losing. Then the Banzhaf Index of k is
defined as
BI(k) = b(k)b(1) + . . . + b(2n + 1) .
For each 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n, we have
(
2n−1
n
)
such winning coalitions that contain 2n + 1
and ∑nr=⌊n/2⌋+1 ( n−1⌊n/2⌋)(nr) such winning coalitions that do not contain 2n + 1. Hence
b( j) =

(
2n−1
n
)
+
(
n−1
(n−1)/2
)
2n−1 n is odd(
2n−1
n
)
+
(
n−1
n/2
) (
2n−1 − 12
(
n
n/2
))
n is even
For k = 2n + 1, we have
b(2n + 1) =
2n∑
r=n+1
(
2n
r
)
−
n∑
r=⌊n/2⌋+1
n∑
s=⌊n/2⌋+1
(
n
r
)(
n
s
)
=

22n−1 − 12
(
2n
n
)
− (2n−1)2 n is odd
22n−1 − 12
(
2n
n
)
−
(
2n−1 − 12
(
n
n/2
))2
n is even
=

22n−2 − 12
(
2n
n
)
n is odd
22n−2 − 12
(
2n
n
)
+ 2n−1
(
n
n/2
)
− 14
(
n
n/2
)2
n is even
Since BI( j) = BI(1) for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ 2n), we shall only consider the ratio of
BI(2n + 1) to BI(1) which is equal to b(2n+1)b(1) .
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Figure 1: The ratio BI(2n + 1)/BI(1)
As seen in both Figure 1, the ratio of the power of 2n + 1 to that of any j
(1 ≤ j ≤ 2n) increases in general as n increases, but the ratio when n is odd
is well below when n is even. Heuristically, it is likely due to the fact that the
power of 2n + 1 is cardinally greater than that of k (i.e. 2n + 1 ≥D k) when n is
even, but this is not the case when n is odd, as shown in Proposition 1. To prove
this observation for the Banzhaf Indice in Figure 1 mathematically, we apply the
Stirling’s approximation for the binomial coefficients:
(
n
k
)
≈ (
n
k− 12 )kek√
2pik . When n is
odd and large, we then have
BI(2n + 1)
BI(1) =
b(2n + 1)
b(1) ≈
√
pi/2
√
n(
√
2 − 1) −
√
2(
√
2 − 1).
While for n is even and large, we have
BI(2n + 1)
BI(1) =
b(2n + 1)
b(1) ≈
√
pi/2
√
n(
√
2 − 1) +
√
2 − 1.
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Figure 2: The ratio SSI(2n + 1)/SSI(1)
Thus, BI(2n+1)BI(1) = O(
√
n) and the gap between the two curves in Figure 1 is about
√
2 − 1 +
√
2(√2 − 1) = 1.
4.2 Shapley-Shubik Index
Let pi =

1 · · · n
pi1 · · · pin
 be a permutation on {1, . . . , n}, then there exists a unique
j such that {pi1, . . . , pi j−1} is not a winning coalition but {pi1, . . . , pi j} is a winning
coalition, and we write vpi = pi j.
For any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the Shapley-Shubik Index of a member k is defined as
SSI(k) = 1
n! |{pi : vpi = k}|.
Note that ∑nj=1 SSI( j) = 1.
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Now consider the invisible representative 2n+ 1 in Legco and the permutation
pi =

1 · · · k k + 1 k + 2 · · · 2n + 1
pi1 · · · pik 2n + 1 pik+1 · · · pi2n
 .
Let r = |{pi1, . . . , pik}∩ {1, . . . , n}| and s = k− r = |{pi1, . . . , pik}∩ {n+1, . . . , 2n}|.
Then vpi = 2n+ 1 if and only if r + s = k ≥ n+ 1 but one of s and r is less than
⌊n/2⌋ + 1, i.e., either
(i) 1 ≤ r ≤ ⌊n/2⌋ and n + 1 − r ≤ s ≤ n; or
(ii) 1 ≤ s ≤ ⌊n/2⌋ and n + 1 − s ≤ r ≤ n.
Note that they are two disjoint cases and have the same number of permutations.
Therefore
SSI(2n + 1) = 2 × 1(2n + 1)!
⌊n/2⌋∑
r=1
n∑
s=n+1−r
(
n
r
)(
n
s
)
(r + s)!(2n − r − s)!
=
2
2n + 1

⌊n/2⌋∑
r=1
n∑
s=n+1−r
(
r + s
r
)(
2n − r − s
n − r
)
(
2n
n
)−1
We do not find any further simplifications of the last expression but numerical
data leads us to make the following
Conjecture 1: SSI(2n + 1) ∼ λn−1/2 for some positive constant λ when n tends to
infinity (which is equivalent to saying that the double sum in SSI(2n+ 1) above is
approximately λ4n).
Conjecture 2: SSI(2n + 1)/SSI(1) = O(√n).
Note that since SSI( j) = SSI(1) (as j =D 1) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n and∑2nj=1 SSI( j)+
SSI(2n+1) = 1, the ratio of SSI(2n+1) to SSI(1) equals to 2nSSI(2n+1)1−SSI(2n+1) . Conjecture
1 will then imply SSI(2n+1)SSI(1) ∼ 2λ
√
n and hence Conjecture 2.
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If Conjecture 2 is true, then we have both SSI(2n+1)SSI(1) and BI(2n+1)BI(1) are of same order
of growth O(√n). Moreover, comparing Figure 1 and Figure 2, it seems that both
SSI(2n+1)
SSI(1) and
BI(2n+1)
BI(1) share the same asymptotic gap behavior. Unfortunately, we
cannot find an explanation of this gap behavior for the Shapley-Shubik index.
Finally, as one can see from Figure 2, for the current Legco (n = 35), the
power of the Hong Kong government is almost three times that of any member in
Legco as SSI(71) = 0.0395 and SSI(k) = 0.0137 for k ≤ 70.
5 Conclusion
The pace of constitutional reform in Hong Kong is a central issue during the five-
month public consultation exercise for the “Methods for Selecting the Chief Ex-
ecutive in 2017 and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2016 Public Consul-
tation”. The mathematical model of Legco introduced in section 3 allows one
to quantify the pace of constitutional reform of Legco from the point of view of
its complexity. In fact, abolishing the difference between a bill proposed by the
government and a Legco member, while keeping the functional constituencies and
the split-voting mechanism will make Legco a bicameral system and its dimension
will be reduced from three to two. If one further abolishes the split-voting mech-
anism, the dimension will then be reduced from two to one (even one keeps the
functional constituencies). This shows that it is the role of the government and the
presence of the split-voting mechanism that determine the dimension of Legco,
not the existence of functional constituencies. In addition, we would also like to
point out that if one only broadens the electorate base of the functional constituen-
cies and implement the so-called ”one person two votes” (i.e., each voter has one
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vote in the direct geographical election and has one vote in one of the functional
constituencies), the dimension of Legco will still be three and therefore, there is
no change in the complexity of the voting system of Legco.
Another possible approach to the constitutional reform in Hong Kong is to
increase the number of the members of both the geographical constituencies and
the functional constituencies (i.e., to increase n in Legco) while keeping the split-
voting mechanism. In section 4, by computing two common power indices, we
find out that the relative power of the Hong Kong government to any member
of Legco increases as odd n increases or even n increases. So according to our
model, the Hong Kong government can actually gain more power (compared with
any individual member) if the size of Legco is increased from 70 to 2n for any
even n > 35.
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